Three worked graphs, four live vaults
A model this opinionated is worth nothing unless somebody has run it on something real. Three risk graphs have been worked end to end with counted nodes and edges, four vaults are published and browsable today, and ten scenarios were written as product content. Every number on these pages is from the source rather than illustrative.
The three worked graphs
The browser-isolation business case
The largest single graph in the corpus, with a full node and edge type distribution. Structured F1–F8, E1–E8, V1–V6, R1–R5, L1–L5. Carries three risks of the mitigation itself, and one deliberately-cited counterweight number that cuts against the argument it appears in.
Read it →The 2FA instance graph
Where the register model was first worked through: nine risks from one missing second factor, an attack mapped to MITRE T1110.004, an interval resolution with a rung struck off — and R2, the governance air gap, where the wrong owner accepts.
Article 26(5): fact to board and back
One provision, one agent, one graph, with its own node and edge inventory. 8 facts (one deliberately unevidenced), 5 risks (one meta), 4 stakeholders, 3 decisions plus one deliberately absent, and 9 questions of which 5 are unanswered.
Read it →The four live vaults
Published, browsable, and the strongest asset this site has. The Risk Graph Explorer runs seven views recomputed simultaneously with ghosted edges for unanswered; Agentic Browser Isolation runs acceptance-gated escalation across five altitudes with no deny button; the Risk Mandate vault is the method applied to its own build across 98 commits; and the Regulation Graph carries the EU AI Act as a citable graph.
All four, with what each one proves →
Two more artefacts
The ten scenarios
Every email you own. Your calendar. The company card. The production database. Each written as hook → reveal → punchline, and the punchline is always the same three words. The one piece of this corpus that actually reached an audience.
Read them →The plug register
The five-dimension profile applied to a real seven-row register, from “agent misuses the isolated session” through to two rows at recoverability: zero — which is what the corrected “no plug” finding looks like when it is written down properly.
Read it →Figures from across the corpus, with what each one is for
| Figure | What it measures | Where it is used here |
|---|---|---|
| 12–18 hours | Hyperscaler cost-reporting delay — a hard detection floor for anything that surfaces as spend | The plug |
| 16 hours | The founder's separate AWS figure: “how much damage can be done in 16 hours” | The plug |
| 30 days vs 6 months | Log retention observed against retention required — “arithmetic, not judgement” | Article 26(5) |
| ~50% → ~1% | Browser prompt-injection attack success across one model generation, from vendor system cards. Cited as the honest counterweight: a large real improvement that still does not reach zero | Browser isolation |
| 63–76% | Security leaders experiencing or witnessing burnout in a single year | Do not internalise |
| 7,500+ participants | Preregistered escalation-of-commitment experiments: precommitment made later de-escalation seem more trustworthy | The ladder |
| ~496,000 words | The size of the June-to-August risk corpus this site consolidates, across ~185 documents | The documents |
What is not on this site. The corpus also contains research briefs naming real organisations in breach and incident narratives, a comparative vendor assessment, and commercial material. Four manifest rows are marked do-not-publish and are not reproduced, quoted or paraphrased anywhere here — the pre-release gate fails the build if their distinctive strings appear. What was excluded, and why →
For an agent
The proof layer. Three risk graphs are worked end to end with counted nodes and edges: browser isolation (59 nodes, 75 edges, 5 altitudes), 2FA (51 nodes, 53 edges; ontology 24 node classes and 34 edge types; MITRE T1110.004), and Article 26(5) (8 facts, 7 evidence, 5 provisions, 3 vulnerabilities, 5 risks, 4 stakeholders, 3 decisions, 9 questions of which 5 unanswered). Four vaults are published and browsable with read keys: Risk Graph Explorer (7 views, ghosted = unanswered, permissions: {}), Agentic Browser Isolation (17 entry points, 5 altitudes, acceptance-gated escalation with no deny button), Risk Mandate (124 files, 98 commits — the method applied to its own build) and Regulation Graph (1,523 nodes, 1,944 edges of the EU AI Act from official Formex XML, hash-verified). Load-bearing figures: 12–18h hyperscaler cost-reporting detection floor · 30 days vs 6 months log retention, the most defensible finding because it is arithmetic · ~50% → ~1% prompt-injection success across a model generation, cited as an honest counterweight. Four manifest rows are do-not-publish and appear nowhere on this site.